Battle of Mycale

Battle of Mycale
Part of the Second Persian invasion of Greece and the Greek counterattack
Part of Mount Mycale, viewed from the ruins of Priene.
Date August 27, 479 BC Location Mycale, Ionia (modern-day Aydın, Turkey) Result Greek victory Territorial changes Persia loses the Aegean islands, Ionia begins second revolt against Persian rule
Belligerents
Greek city-states Sparta Athens Corinth Sicyon Troezen	Achaemenid Empire
Commanders and leaders
Leotychides Xanthippus Perilaus †	Artaÿntes Masistes Ithamitres Mardontes † Tigranes †
Strength
40,000 men 110 ships	60,000 men 300 ships
Casualties and losses
Considerable	Most of the army and all the ships

The Battle of Mycale (Ancient Greek: Μάχη τῆς Μυκάλης; Machē tēs Mykalēs) was one of the two major battles (the other being the Battle of Plataea) that ended the second Persian invasion of Greece during the Greco-Persian Wars. It took place on or about August 27, 479 BC on the slopes of Mount Mycale, on the coast of Ionia, opposite the island of Samos. The battle was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states, including Sparta, Athens and Corinth, and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I.

The previous year, the Persian invasion force, led by Xerxes himself, had scored victories at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium, and conquered Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica; however, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the allied Greek navies had won an unlikely victory, and therefore prevented the conquest of the Peloponnese. Xerxes then retreated, leaving his general Mardonius with a substantial army to finish off the Greeks the following year.

In the summer of 479 BC, the Greeks assembled an army, and marched to confront Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea. At the same time, the allied fleet sailed to Samos, where the demoralized remnants of the Persian navy were based. The Persians, seeking to avoid a battle, beached their fleet below the slopes of Mycale, and, with the support of a Persian army group, built a palisaded camp. The Greek commander Leotychides decided to attack the Persians anyway, landing the fleet's complement of marines to do so.

Although the Persian forces put up stout resistance, the heavily armoured Greek hoplites again proved themselves superior in combat, and eventually routed the Persian troops, who fled to their camp. The Ionian Greek contingents in the Persian army defected, and the camp was assailed, with a large number of Persians slaughtered. The Persian ships were then captured and burned. The complete destruction of the Persian navy, along with the destruction of Mardonius' army at Plataea (allegedly on the same day as the Battle of Mycale), decisively ended the invasion of Greece. After Plataea and Mycale, the allied Greeks would take the offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars. Although Mycale was in every sense a decisive victory, it does not seem to have been attributed the same significance (even at the time) as, for example, the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon or even the Greek defeat at the Battle of Thermopylae.

Background

Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars, First Persian invasion of Greece, and Second Persian invasion of Greece

After Xerxes I was crowned the emperor of the Achaemenid Empire, he quickly resumed preparations for the invasion of Greece, including building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed, generally referred to as the Allies. In August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the vastly outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by the Persians who used an unknown mountain path.

A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle.

After Thermopylae, the Persian army had burned and sacked the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae, before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth. The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with a minor portion of his army.

Xerxes left Mardonius with most of his army. Mardonius decided to camp for the winter in Thessaly. The 110 ships of the Greek fleet were anchored at Aegina under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides in the spring of 479 BC. Envoys from Chios managed to persuade the Greek fleet to move to Delos.

Meanwhile, the Athenian navy under Xanthippus had joined with the Allied fleet off Delos. They were then approached by a delegation from Samos under the leadership of Hegesistratos, who suggested that the Ionian cities were eager to revolt. They furthermore pointed out the poor morale and reduced seaworthiness of the Persian fleet. Leotychides and the council of war decided to attempt this maneuver, and sailed for Samos. Leotychides found Hegesistratos' name to be a good omen, since it meant "Army Leader". The delegation from Samos, as envoys of their nation, pledged their loyalty to the Hellenic alliance.

Movements of the Persian and Greek armies in 480–479 BC.

The historian George Cawkwell notes that the Persian fleet had moved from Samos to Mycale for protection, according to Herodotus. The historians Michael Flower and John Marincola argue that the Greeks may have decided to sail to Samos only because they were told about a potential Ionian revolt and about the disrepair of the Persian fleet. Flower and Marincola note that the Greeks had previously been quite hesitant to sail beyond Delos because of the Persian fleet. The historian Marcello Lupi also notes that the Greek fleet had sailed at the insistence of the Samians and had been unwilling to chase the Persians after Salamis, hesitating to move out of Delos.

Flower and Marincola argue that the envoys from Samos were more reliable than the envoys from Chios, since the latter were "conspirators on the run" while the former were representatives of their people. They note how Hegesistratos had pointed out that there was a chance the Persian fleet could be seized with one maneuver. They argue that Leotychides may have considered this a risk he could take. They also note that the Greek fleet had already sailed for Samos when their ambassadors reported the dismissal of the Phoenician ships from the Persian fleet.

Opposing forces

Persians

Herodotus gives the size of the Persian fleet at 300 ships which wintered at Cyme. The Phoenician ships were dismissed from the Persian fleet before the battle, which reduced its strength further. Tigranes was the commander of the Persian land forces at Mycale. Artaÿntes was the joint commander of the Persian fleet, and he appointed his nephew, Ithamitres, as the third commander of the fleet. Herodotus states that there were 60,000 men in the Persian army.

Greek hoplite (right) and Persian warrior (left), fighting each other. Ancient kylix, 5th century BC.

Greeks

The historian Andrew Robert Burn estimates the Greek fleet to have had 110 ships. Burn notes that the figure of 250 ships is only stated by Ephorus. The standard complement of a trireme was 200 men, including 14 marines. Flower and Marincola estimate that the Greeks had 3,300 marines, with the 110 ships having 30 marines each. They note that the complement of marines on a trireme was probably not fixed, with Plutarch stating that there were 14 marines on each trireme at Salamis. Herodotus had stated that the Chian ships at the Battle of Lade had carried 40 marines each. This suggests that a trireme could probably carry a maximum of 40 to 45 soldiers, because triremes seem to have been easily destabilized by extra weight.

Burn notes that the Greek contingent of marines was strong, and strongly considers the possibility that some of the Greek oarsmen could have served as light infantry. Cawkwell argues that the Greeks would have had only 2,000 to 3,000 marines, because their ships had mostly naval personnel onboard. Flower and Marincola argue that the Athenians did not have the numbers to provide marines for 50 triremes and 8,000 hoplites at Plataea both at the same time. They thus argue that the claim of 250 ships in the Greek fleet is not realistic.

Prelude

When the Persians heard that the Allied fleet was approaching, they set sail from Samos towards Mycale in the Ionian mainland, possibly because they had decided they could not fight a naval battle. During the chaos of their retreat, the Samians freed 500 Athenian captives. The historian Andrew Robert Burn argues that the Persian fleet had anchored at Mycale because their commanders thought it would be "useless to fight at sea".

The Persians took away the armor and weapons of the Samians in their army, finding them unreliable. Furthermore, they sent the Milesians to their rear to guard the passes over Mycale, suspecting that the Milesians might also defect. To the south of these passes, on the beaches on the route from Samos, the Persians moored their fleet behind the cover of rocks, and built abatis (field fortifications) with the wood they had cut recently. With their preparations in place, the Persians decided to defend their position.

Map showing position of Mount Mycale in relation to Lade, Samos and Miletus.

The Greeks encamped at Kalamoi, adjacent to the Heraion of Samos. Because their opponent was inactive, there were plans to not fight a battle, and instead attack the Persian communications center at the Hellespont. However, they decided to attack their opponent and his fleet, and moved towards Mycale. The Greek fleet moved towards the shore and called on the Ionians to revolt. The Greeks then sailed farther and their soldiers landed in a location beyond the line of sight of their opponents. Herodotus reports that as the Allied Greeks approached the Persian camp, rumor spread amongst them of an Allied victory at Plataea earlier on in the day.

The battle

The Allies probably formed into two wings. On the right were the Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians and Troezenians; around half of the army, who took up positions starting from the shore and ending at the foothils of Mount Mycale. On the left were the Spartans with the other contingents, deployed on the hills in uneven terrain. The battle of Mycale commenced in the afternoon on the same day as the battle of Plataea, which the historian Paul A. Rahe estimates took place on the 27th or 28th of August. The battle began when the Greek right wing began fighting with the Persians while their left wing was still crossing the hills. The Persians moved out from their camp and put up their shield wall. Burn argues that Tigranes wanted to vanquish half of the Greeks facing him while the other half had still not arrived on the battlefield.

The Greek right, under arrow volleys, decided to fight in close quarters. Until the Persian shield wall was unbroken, the Persians defended their position. The Greeks managed to break through the wall by shoving. The Persians fought back initially, but then broke their lines and escaped to their camp. The soldiers of the right wing followed them into the camp, and most of the Persian soldiers fled from the camp, except the ethnic Persian troops, who grouped together and fought the Allied soldiers who had entered the camp. Finally, the left wing arrived, outflanking the camp and falling on the rear of the remaining Persian forces, thereby completing the rout.

Schematic diagram of the Battle of Mycale.

Herodotus tells us that, on seeing the outcome of the battle hung in the balance, the disarmed Samians had joined in on the side of the allies, doing what they could. This inspired the other Ionian contingents to turn on the Persians as well. Meanwhile, the Milesians who were guarding the passes of Mycale also turned on the Persians. At first they misdirected the fleeing Persian contingents so that they ended up back amongst the Allied troops; then, perhaps seeing the outcome of the battle was certain, they began killing the fleeing Persians. The Greeks then burned the Persian fleet after a heavily contested fight with the Persian marines, after taking out the loot from the ships to the beach.

Herodotus does not mention specific figures for casualties, merely saying that losses were heavy on both sides. The Sicyonians in particular suffered, also losing their general Perilaus. On the Persian side, the admiral Mardontes and the general Tigranes were both killed, though Artaÿntes and Ithamitres escaped.

Aftermath

Main articles: Battle of Plataea and Greco-Persian Wars

With the twin victories of Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover, the threat of a future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried that Xerxes would try again, over time it became apparent that the Persian desire to conquer Greece was much diminished. The Greeks returned to Samos and discussed their next moves. The Allied fleet then sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this had already been done. The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians. The Persians in the region, and their allies, made for Sestos, the strongest town in the region, and the Athenians laid siege to them there. After a protracted siege, Sestos fell to the Athenians, marking the beginning of a new phase in the Greco-Persian Wars, the Greek counterattack.

After the battle, there were concerns over how the Greeks of Asia Minor could be defended from Persian vengeance. The Peloponnesians suggested a population exchange, where the Greeks who did not want to live under Persian rule would be relocated in northern Greece, on the properties of the medizers who would be expelled. However, since all of northern Greece had surrendered to the Persians, this plan was abandoned. Also, Xanthippus had claimed that the Greeks of Asia Minor were Athenian settlers, and thus Athens would not let their settlements be abandoned. Burn found this idea of a population exchange to have parallels with the population exchange between Greece and Turkey implemented 24 centuries later.

Burn also found a repeat of the Battle of Mycale in the Battle of the Eurymedon, fought by the Athenian general Cimon against the Persians in 466 BC. After the battle, the Persian marshal Masistes would hurl the accusation that the surviving naval commanders were cowards; Burn, however, argues that they were probably just trying to get their non-Persian soldiers back to the battlefield.

Analysis

Flower and Marincola note that the speech made by Hegesistratos has many similarities with the speech made by Aristagoras of Miletus, when the latter traveled to Sparta and Athens for gaining allies in support of the Ionian Revolt of 499 BC. They observe that many of the predictions made by Hegesistratos did not materialise: the Ionians did not revolt when the Greeks arrived in Ionia, and did so only after the people of Samos and Miletus rebelled first. They note how odd it is that the Persians did not attack the Greeks while the latter were landing, and quote Demosthenes, who had remarked that a naval landing could not be executed successfully when an opponent who held the land resolved to fight.

The historian George Cawkwell argues that the major military lesson of both Mycale and Plataea was the repeated confirmation of the superiority of the hoplite over the more lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been demonstrated at Marathon. As a result, after the Greco-Persian Wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries. Cawkwell argues that the numbers given by Herodotus are highly overstated. He further argues that the battle was a "very minor affair", but its outcomes were major because it led to an Ionian revolt. Cawkwell observes that the withdrawal of the majority of the Persian fleet just before the battle of Mycale was a grave mistake. Cawkwell argues that Tigranes wouldn't have had a lot of troops with him. He argues that the Persian fleet did not have the required number of soldiers to fight the Greek fleet, and sailed to Mycale because of the presence of Tigranes' troops.

Burn argues that the destruction of the Persian fleet at Mycale allowed Greek fleets absolute freedom of movement. The Persian and Median marines, as well as the Persian regiments in Tigranes' army, were almost completely massacred. In their absence, the Persian vassals had refused to fight and fled.

Historiography

Main article: Herodotus

The main source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the ancient Greek historian Herodotus. He gives an account of the battle of Mycale in Book Nine of his Histories. The historian Detlev Fehling noted multiple similarities in Herodotus' accounts, which he argued were arbitrary insertions by Herodotus. Fehling noted that the Spartan nauarch (fleet commander) at Mycale had used the same plan used by Themistocles at the Battle of Artemisium, and the Ionian tyrants at the Battle of Lade. Fehling also notes how the shield wall fighting is always concluded by the Athenians in Herodotus' accounts, especially at Plataea and Mycale.

The historians Michael Flower and John Marincola also found these similarities between the battles of Plataea and Mycale to be suspicious, especially since the victories there gave both Sparta and Athens, respectively, similar triumphs on the same day. Flower and Marincola note that the victory at Mycale was not celebrated by any Athenian orators, who were otherwise proud of their other achievements in the Persian Wars. They argue that this was because the leader at Mycale was a Spartan in what could be considered a naval battle, a domain where the Athenians believed they were better. They also note how the aristeia (heroic moment) of the Athenians takes place on Ionian lands, and wonder whether this part of Herodotus' account is structured to justify the Athenian claim to the command of the Delian League.

Burn found Herodotus' account to be biased towards the Athenians. He also finds the battle of Mycale to have parallels with the Battle of Plataea, as both battles saw only one flank engaged in combat, and both witnessed fighting at the shield walls and camps of the Persians. Burn states that Mycale was a "relatively small battle", and notes how Thucydides does not consider it as important as Salamis or Artemisium.

The ancient Greek historian Plutarch, in his account, had noted the Corinthian gallantry at Mycale. Flower and Marincola find the account of Mycale given by Diodorus Siculus to be unreliable and mixed with arbitrary claims by Ephorus of Cyme, his primary source. They also note that in Herodotus' account, the fallen Greek soldiers are buried after the battle of Thermopylae, but not after the battles of Mycale, Salamis or Marathon.

Bibliography

Books

• Burn, Andrew Robert (1966). The Pelican History of Greece. Penguin Books. ISBN 9780140207927.
• Burn, Andrew Robert (1984). Persia and the Greeks. The Defence of the West, c. 546-478 B. C. (2nd ed.). Gerald Duckworth & Co. ISBN 9780715617113.
• Cawkwell, George (2005). The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198148715.001.0001. ISBN 9780198148715.
• Fehling, Detlev (1971). Die Quellenangaben bei Herodot: Studien zur Erzählkunst Herodots [The Sources of Herodotus: Studies of Herodotus' Narrative Art]. Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte [Studies in Ancient Literature and History] (in German). Vol. 9. De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110841930. ISBN 9783110036343.
• Flower, Michael A.; Marincola, John (2002). Herodotus. Histories Book IX. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521596503.
• Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Fall of Carthage. Cassel. ISBN 9780304366422.
• Green, Peter (1996). The Greco-Persian Wars. University of California Press. doi:10.1525/9780520917064. ISBN 9780520203136.
• Hignett, Charles (1963). Xerxes' Invasion of Greece. Clarendon Press. ISBN 9780198142478.
• Lazenby, John Francis (1993). The Defence of Greece, 490-479 B.C. Aris & Phillips. ISBN 9780856685910.
• Lupi, Marcello (2017). "Sparta and the Persian Wars, 499–478". In Powell, Anton (ed.). A Companion to Sparta. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 269–290. doi:10.1002/9781119072379.ch10. ISBN 9781405188692.
• Rahe, Paul (2015). The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge. Yale Library of Military History. Yale University Press. doi:10.12987/9780300218602. ISBN 978-0-300-11642-7. JSTOR j.ctvmd857x.
• Shepherd, William (2012). Plataea 479 BC: The Most Glorious Victory Ever Seen. Osprey Campaign Series. Vol. 239. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781849085540.

External links

• Livius Picture Archive: Mycale (Dilek Dagi).